In Moral Relativism of Steven Lukes, he writes about the right description of the meaning of words as important. He gives examples ( p. 74 ) of acts which are different. In A Daoist theory of Chinese thought Chad Hansen writes about the importance of the right ming (names) in moral conversation.
image: Door Wouter Engler – Eigen werk, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=38610015
A blackface in USA is regarded as morally wrong. In the Netherlands the ‘Zwarte Piet’ with a black face by some people is regarded as wrong. Discussion is about if both black faces are the same phenomenon and thus both wrong, or if they are very different
Is this morally sensitive en emotional discussion an example of moral relativism or moral universalism?
Or do the different opinions about this black face … point to the distinction between a shared moral principle and divergent factual believes. (Lukes p. 80)?
(we share a moral principle on racism but our views on facts about both phenomena are different)
If we want to change an habit on moral grounds, is naming and shaming the right and effective way to change that habit? Naming and shaming causes strong counter reactions, and very often no cooperation or change of habits at all. (Except maybe between parents and children, superiors and underlings )
Is the word (noun) culture a useful category? Inside a culture differences are as great as outside cultures, personal and family cultures differ from the group cultures and the national cultures they ‘belong’ to. The name ‘Muslim culture’ is clear and useful as long as we do not look into the culture. I know too much different Muslims, that makes it really impossible to see a common Muslim culture in all these very different people.
Culture is a category with the Platonic disease, we do believe something as a culture exists because the name ‘culture’ exists.